Abstract. We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is decidable, even if we put a constraint on the payoff of the equilibrium. Our undecidability result holds even for a restricted class of concurrent games, where nonzero rewards occur only on terminal states. Moreover, we show that the constrained existence problem is undecidable not only for concurrent games but for turn-based games with the same restriction on rewards. Finally, we prove that the constrained existence problem for Nash equilibria in (pure or randomised) stationary strategies is decidable and analyse its complexity.
Introduction
Concurrent games provide a versatile model for the interaction of several components in a distributed system where the components perform actions in parallel [17] . Classically, such a system is modelled by a family of concurrent two-player games, one for each component, where one component tries to fulfil its specification against the coalition of all other components. In practice, this modelling is often too pessimistic because it ignores the specifications of the other components. We argue that a distributed system is more faithfully modelled by a multiplayer game where each player has her own objective, which is independent of the other players' objectives.
Another objection to the classical theory of verification and synthesis has been that specifications are qualitative: either the specification is fulfilled, or it is violated. Examples of such specifications include reachability properties, where a certain set of target states has to be reached, or safety properties, where a certain set of states has to be avoided. In practice, many specifications are of a quantitative nature, examples of which include minimising average power consumption or maximising average throughput. Specifications of the latter kind can be expressed by assigning (positive or negative) rewards to states or transitions and considering the limit-average reward gained from an infinite play. In fact, concurrent games where a player's payoff is defined in such a way have been a central topic in game theory (see the related work section below).
The most common solution concept for games with multiple players is that of a Nash equilibrium [20] . In a Nash equilibrium, no player can improve her payoff by changing her strategy unilaterally. Unfortunately, Nash equilibria do not always exist in concurrent games, and if they exist, they may not be unique. In applications, one might look for an equilibrium where some players receive a high payoff while other players receive a low payoff. Formulated as a decision problem, given a game with k players and thresholds x, y ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞}) k , we want to know whether the game has a Nash equilibrium whose payoff lies in-between x and y; we call this decision problem NE.
The problem NE comes in several variants, depending on the type of strategies one considers: On the one hand, strategies may be randomised (allowing randomisation over actions) or pure (not allowing such randomisation). On the other hand, one can restrict to strategies that use finite memory or even to stationary strategies, which only depend on the last state. Indeed, we show that these restrictions give rise to distinct decision problems, which have to be analysed separately.
Our results show that the complexity of NE highly depends on the type of strategies that realise the equilibrium. In particular, we prove the following results, which yield an almost complete picture of the complexity of NE:
1. NE for pure stationary strategies (or pure strategies with bounded memory) is NP-complete. 2. NE for stationary strategies (or randomised strategies with bounded memory) is decidable in Pspace, but hard for both NP and SqrtSum. 3. NE for arbitrary pure strategies is NP-complete. 4 . NE for arbitrary randomised strategies is undecidable.
All of our lower bounds for NE and, in particular, our undecidability result hold already for a subclass of concurrent games where Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist, namely for turn-based games. If this assumption is relaxed and Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exist, we prove that even the plain existence problem for Nash equilibria is undecidable. Moreover, many of our lower bounds hold already for games where non-zero rewards only occur on terminal states, and thus also for games where each player wants to maximise the total sum of the rewards.
As a byproduct of our decidability proof for pure strategies, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for deciding whether in a multi-weighted graph there exists a path whose limit-average weight vector lies between two given thresholds, a result that is of independent interest. For instance, our algorithm can be used for deciding the emptiness of a multi-threshold mean-payoff language [2] in polynomial time.
related work. Concurrent and, more generally, stochastic games go back to Shapley [24] , who proved the existence of the value for discounted two-player zero-sum games. This result was later generalised by Fink [13] who proved that every discounted game has a Nash equilibrium. Gillette [16] introduced limit-average objectives, and Mertens & Neyman [19] proved the existence of the value for stochastic two-player zero-sum games with limit-average objectives. Unfortunately, as demonstrated by Everett [12] , these games do, in general, not admit a Nash equilibrium (see Example 1) . However, Vielle [29, 30] proved that, for all ε > 0, every two-player stochastic limit-average game admits an ε-equilibrium, i.e. a pair of strategies where each player can gain at most ε from switching her strategy. Whether such equilibria always exist in games with more than two players is an important open question [21] .
Determining the complexity of Nash equilibria has attracted much interest in recent years. In particular, a series of papers culminated in the result that computing a Nash equilibrium of a finite two-player game in strategic form is complete for the complexity class PPAD [6, 8] . The constrained existence problem, where one looks for a Nash equilibrium with certain properties, has also been investigated for games in strategic form. In particular, Conitzer & Sandholm [7] showed that deciding whether there exists a Nash equilibrium whose payoff exceeds a given threshold and related decision problems are NP-complete for two-player games in strategic form.
For concurrent games with limit-average objectives, most algorithmic results concern two-player zero-sum games. In the turn-based case, these games are commonly known as mean-payoff games [10, 32] . While it is known that the value of such a game can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time, it is still open whether there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for solving mean-payoff games. A related model are multi-dimensional mean-payoff games where one player tries to maximise several mean-payoff conditions at the same time [5] . In particular, Velner & Rabinovich [28] showed that the value problem for these games is coNP-complete.
One subclass of concurrent games with limit-average objectives that has been studied in the multiplayer setting are concurrent games with reachability objectives. In particular, Bouyer et al. [3] showed that the constrained existence problem for Nash equilibria is NP-complete for these games (see also [26, 14] ). We extend their result to limit-average objectives. However, we assume that strategies can observe actions (a common assumption in game theory), which they do not. Hence, while our result is more general w.r.t. the type of objectives we consider, their result is more general w.r.t. the type of strategies they allow.
In a recent paper [27] , we studied the complexity of Nash equilibria in stochastic games with reachability objectives. In particular, we proved that NE for pure strategies is undecidable in this setting. Since we prove here that this problem is decidable in the non-stochastic setting, this undecidability result can be explained by the presence of probabilistic transitions in stochastic games. On the other hand, we prove in this paper that randomisation in strategies also leads to undecidability, a question that was left open in [27] .
Concurrent Games
Concurrent games are played by finitely many players on a finite state space. Formally, a concurrent game is given by -a finite nonempty set Π of players, e.g. Π = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}, -a finite nonempty set S of states, -for each player i and each state s a nonempty set Γ i (s) of actions taken from a finite set Γ, -a transition function δ : S × Γ Π → S, -for each player i ∈ Π a reward function r i : S → R.
For computational purposes, we assume that all rewards are rational numbers with numerator and denominator given in binary. We say that an action profile a = (a i ) i∈Π is legal at state s if a i ∈ Γ i (s) for each i ∈ Π. Finally, we call a state s controlled by player i if |Γ j (s)| = 1 for all j ̸ = i, and we say that a game is turn-based if each state is controlled by (at least) one player. For turn-based games, an action of the controlling player prescribes to go to a certain state. Hence, we will usually omit actions in turn-based games.
For a tuple x = (x i ) i∈Π , where the elements x i belong to an arbitrary set X, and an element x ∈ X, we denote by x −i the restriction of x to Π \ {i} and by (x −i , x) the unique tuple y ∈ X Π with y i = x and y −i = x −i .
A play of a game G is an infinite sequence
For each player, a play π = s 0 a 0 s 1 a 1 . . . gives rise to an infinite sequence of rewards. There are different criteria to evaluate this sequence and map it to a payoff. In this paper, we consider the limit-average (or mean-payoff ) criterion, where the payoff of π for player i is defined by
Note that this payoff mapping is prefix-independent, i.e. strategies and strategy profiles. For a finite set X, we denote by D(X) the set of probability distributions over X. A (randomised) strategy for player i in G is a mapping σ : (S · Γ Π ) * · S → D(Γ) assigning to each possible history xs ∈ (S · Γ Π ) * · S a probability distribution σ(xs) over actions such that
We write σ(a | xs) for the probability assigned to a ∈ Γ by the distribution σ(xs). A (randomised) strategy profile of G is a tuple σ = (σ i ) i∈Π of strategies in G, one for each player. Note that a strategy profile can be identified with a function σ : . . a j−1 s j ) = a j for all j ∈ N; we call π the play induced by σ from s 0 . A memory structure for G is a triple M = (M, δ, m 0 ), where M is a set of memory states, δ : M × S × Γ Π → M is the update function, and m 0 ∈ M is the initial memory. A (randomised) strategy with memory M for player i is a function σ : M × S → D(Γ) such that σ(m, s)(a) > 0 only if a ∈ Γ i (s). The strategy σ is pure if the distribution σ(m, s) is degenerate for all m ∈ M and s ∈ S. A (pure) strategy σ with memory M can be viewed as a (pure) strategy σ ′ in the usual sense by setting σ ′ (xs) = σ(δ * (x), s), where δ * (x) is defined inductively by δ * (ε) = m 0 and δ * (x · sa) = δ(δ * (x), s, a). A finite-state strategy is a strategy σ with finite memory M. If the memory M is a singleton, we call σ stationary. Moreover, we call a strategy positional if it is both pure and stationary. A stationary strategy can thus be represented by a mapping σ : S → D(Γ), and a positional strategy by a mapping σ : S → Γ. Finally, we call a strategy profile finite-state, stationary or positional if each strategy in the profile has the respective property. the probability measure induced by a strategy profile. Given an initial state s 0 ∈ S and a strategy profile σ = (σ i ) i∈Π , the conditional probability of
The probabilities σ(a | xs) induce a probability measure on the Borel σ-algebra over (S · Γ Π ) ω as follows: The probability of a basic open set s 1 a 1 . . . s n a n · (S · Γ Π ) ω equals the product ∏ n j=1 σ(a j | s 1 a 1 . . . a j−1 s j ) if s 1 = s 0 and δ(s j , a j ) = s j+1 for all 1 ≤ j < n; in all other cases, this probability is 0. By Carathéodory's extension theorem, this extends to a unique probability measure assigning a probability to every Borel subset of (S · Γ Π ) ω , which we denote by Pr
ω → S ω , we obtain a probability measure on the In order to apply known results about Markov chains, we can also view the stochastic process induced by a strategy profile σ as a countable Markov chain G σ , defined as follows: The set of states of G σ equals the set (S · Γ Π ) * · S of histories of G. The only transitions from a state xs lead to states of the form xsat where t = δ(s, a), and such a transition occurs with probability σ(a | xs).
For each player i, the Markov decision process G σ −i has the same states as G σ , and there is a transition from a state xs to a state xsat with action a ∈ Γ i (s) and probability p if a i = a, δ(s, a) = t and p = ∏ j̸ =i σ j (a j ). Finally, the reward of a state xs in G σ −i equals the reward r i (s) of the state s for player i in G.
If σ is a strategy profile with finite memory M, we make G σ and G σ −i finite by quotienting the state space w.r.t. the equivalence relation ∼, defined by xs ∼ yt if s = t and δ * (x) = δ * (y). In particular, if σ is stationary, then the state spaces of G σ and G σ −i coincide with the state space of G.
drawing concurrent games. When drawing a concurrent game as a graph, we will adhere to the following conventions: States are usually depicted as circles, but terminal states are depicted as squares. The initial state is marked by a dangling incoming edge. An edge from s to t with label a means that δ(s, a) = t and that a is legal at s. However, the label a might be omitted if it is not essential. In turn-based games, the player who controls a state is indicated by the label next to it. Finally, a label of the form i : x next to state s indicates that r i (s) = x; if this reward is 0, the label will usually be omitted. (a, a) Figure 1 . A terminal-reward game that has no Nash equilibrium.
(a, a) Figure 2 . A limit-average game that has no Nash equilibrium.
Nash Equilibria
To capture rational behaviour of selfish players, Nash [20] introduced the notion of -what is now called -a Nash equilibrium. Formally, given a game G and an initial state s 0 , a strategy τ for player i is a best response to a strategy profile σ if τ maximises the expected payoff for player i, i.e.
for all strategies τ ′ for player i. A strategy profile σ = (σ i ) i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium of (G, s 0 ) if for each player i the strategy σ i is a best response to σ. Hence, in a Nash equilibrium no player can improve her payoff by (unilaterally) switching to a different strategy. As the following examples demonstrate, Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exist in concurrent games. Example 1. Consider the terminal-reward game G 1 depicted in Figure 1 and played by players 1 and 2, which was originally presented in [9] . We claim that (G 1 , s 1 ) does not have a Nash equilibrium. First note that, for each ε > 0, player 1 can ensure a payoff of 1 − 2ε by the stationary strategy that selects action b with probability ε. Hence, every Nash equilibrium (σ, τ) of (G 1 , s 1 ) must have payoff (1, −1). Now we distinguish whether σ(b | (s 1 (a, a) ) k s 1 ) = 0 for all k ∈ N or not. In the first case, there must exist k ∈ N such that τ(b | (s 1 (a, a) ) k s 1 ) > 0 (otherwise (σ, τ) would not have payoff (1, −1)). But then Player 2 can improve her payoff by always playing action a with probability 1, a contradiction to (σ, τ) being a Nash equilibrium. In the second case, consider the least k such that p := σ(b | (s 1 (a, a) ) k s 1 ) > 0. By choosing action b with probability 1 for the history (s 1 (a, a)) k s 1 and choosing action a with probability 1 for all other histories, player 2 can ensure payoff p, again a contradiction to (σ, τ) being a Nash equilibrium.
Example 2. A variation of the previous game is the game G 2 , which is depicted in Figure 2 and also played by players 1 and 2. It is not a terminal-reward game, but the only rewards that occur in the game are 0 and 1. Using almost the same argumentation as in Example 1, we can show that (G 2 , s 1 ) has no Nash equilibrium either. It follows from Nash's theorem [20] that every game whose arena is a tree (or a DAG) has a Nash equilibrium. Another important special case of concurrent limit-average games where Nash equilibria always exist are turn-based games. For these games, Thuijsman & Raghavan [25] proved not only the existence of arbitrary Nash equilibria but of pure finite-state ones.
To measure the complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games, we introduce the following decision problem, which we call NE:
Given a game G, a state s 0 and thresholds x, y ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞}) Π , decide whether (G, s 0 ) has a Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
Note that we have not put any restriction on the type of strategies that realise the equilibrium. It is natural to restrict the search space to profiles of pure, stationary or positional strategies. These restrictions give rise to different decision problems, which we call PureNE, StatNE and PosNE, respectively.
Before we analyse the complexity of these problems, let us convince ourselves that these problems are not just different faces of the same coin. We first show that the decision problems where we look for equilibria in randomised strategies are distinct from the ones where we look for equilibria in pure strategies.
Proposition 3.
There exists a turn-based terminal-reward game that has a stationary Nash equilibrium where player 0 receives payoff 1 but that has no pure Nash equilibrium where player 0 receives payoff > 0.
Proof. Consider the game depicted in Figure 3 and played by three players 0, 1 and 2. Clearly, the stationary strategy profile where at state s 2 player 0 selects both outgoing transitions with probability 1 2 each, player 1 plays from s 0 to s 1 and player 2 plays from s 1 to s 2 is a Nash equilibrium where player 0 receives payoff 1. However, in any pure strategy profile where player 0 receives payoff > 0, either player 1 or player 2 receives payoff 0 and could improve her payoff by switching her strategy at s 0 or s 1 , respectively. Now we show that it makes a difference whether we look for an equilibrium in stationary strategies or not.
Proposition 4.
There exists a turn-based terminal-reward game that has a pure Nash equilibrium where player 0 receives payoff 1 but that has no stationary Nash equilibrium where player 0 receives payoff > 0.
Proof. Consider the game G depicted in Figure 4 and played by three players 0, 1 and 2. Clearly, the pure strategy profile that leads to the terminal state with payoff 1 for player 0 and where player 0 plays "right" if player 1 has deviated and "left" if player 2 has deviated is a Nash equilibrium of (G, s 0 ) with payoff 1 for player 0. Now consider any stationary equilibrium of (G, s 0 ) where player 0 receives payoff > 0. If the stationary strategy of player 0 prescribes to play "right" with positive probability, then player 2 can improve her payoff by playing to s 2 with probability 1, and otherwise player 1 can improve her payoff by playing to s 2 with probability 1, a contradiction.
It follows from Section 3 that NE and StatNE are different from PureNE and PosNE, and it follows from Proposition 4 that NE and PureNE are different from StatNE and PosNE. Hence, all of these decision problems are pairwise distinct, and their decidability and complexity has to be studied separately.
Positional Strategies
In this section, we show that the problem PosNE is NP-complete; we start by proving the upper bound.
Theorem 5. PosNE is in NP.
Proof. To decide PosNE on input G, s 0 , x, y, we start by guessing a positional strategy profile σ of G, i.e. mappings σ i : S → Γ such that σ i (s) ∈ Γ i (s) for all i ∈ Π and s ∈ S. Then, we verify whether σ is a Nash equilibrium with the desired payoff. To do this, we first compute the payoff z i of σ for each player i by computing the number E σ s 0 (φ i ) in the finite Markov chain G σ . Since G σ is deterministic, this number equals the average weight (for player i) on the unique simple cycle reachable from s 0 and can thus be computed in polynomial time. Once each z i is computed, we can easily check whether x i ≤ z i ≤ y i . To verify that σ is a Nash equilibrium, we additionally compute, for each player i, the value v i of the finite MDP G σ −i from s 0 . This number can be computed by identifying the highest average weight (for player i) on a simple cycle reachable in G σ −i from s 0 , which can also be done in polynomial time [18] . Clearly, σ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if v i ≤ z i for each player i.
A result by Chatterjee et al. [5, Lemma 15] implies that PosNE is NP-hard, even for turn-based games with rewards taken from {−1, 0, 1} (but with an unbounded number of players). We strengthen their result by showing that the problem remains NP-hard if there are only three players and rewards are taken from {0, 1}. Theorem 6. PosNE is NP-hard, even for turn-based three-player games with rewards 0 and 1.
Proof. We reduce from the Hamiltonian cycle problem. Given a graph G = (V, E), we define a turn-based three-player game G as follows: the set of states is V, all states are controlled by player 0, and the transition function corresponds to E (i. 
Consider the positional strategy σ of player 0 that plays from π(i) to π(i + 1) for all i < n. The induced play from v 0 is the play (π(0)π(1) . . . π(n − 1)) ω , which gives payoff 1 to player 0, payoff 1/n to player 1 and payoff (n − 1)/n to player 2. Moreover, it is obvious that we have a Nash equilibrium.
(⇐) Let π be the play induced by a positional Nash equilibrium of (G, By combining our reduction with a game that has no positional Nash equilibrium, we can prove the following stronger result for non-turn-based games.
Corollary 7.
Deciding the existence of a positional Nash equilibrium in a concurrent limit-average game is NP-complete, even for three-player games with rewards 0 and 1.
Proof. Membership in NP follows from Theorem 5. To prove hardness, we reduce from the following problem, whose NP-hardness follows from the proof of Theorem 6: Given a three-player game (G, s 0 ) with rewards 0 and 1 and n ∈ N (given in unary), decide whether (G, s 0 ) has a positional Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ (1, 1/n, (n − 1)/n). From G, we construct a new game G ′ , which employs the game G 2 from Example 2 and is depicted in Figure 5 ; we set the reward for player 0 in all states of G 2 to 1. Note that we can simulate the fractional rewards in the terminal state by a cycle of n states with rewards 0 and 1. We claim that (G ′ , s ′ 0 ) has a positional Nash equilibrium if and only if (G, s 0 ) has a positional Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ (1, 1/n, (n − 1)/n).
(⇒) Let σ be a positional Nash equilibrium of (G ′ , s ′ 0 ). Since (G 2 , s 1 ) does not have a Nash equilibrium, the induced play must either enter the game G or end at the terminal state with payoff 0 for player 0. But the latter case is impossible since then player 0 could improve her payoff by playing action b at s ′ 0 . Hence, the induced play enters G, and σ is also a Nash equilibrium of (G, s 0 ). Moreover, σ must have payoff at least (1, 1/n, (n − 1)/n) since otherwise player 1 or player 2 could improve her payoff by playing action b at s ′ 1 . (⇐) Let σ be a positional Nash equilibrium of (G, s 0 ) with payoff at least (1, 1/n, (n − 1)/n). We can extend σ to a positional Nash equilibrium of (G ′ ,
Stationary Strategies
To prove the decidability of StatNE, we appeal to results established for the existential theory of the reals, the set of all existential first-order sentences (over the appropriate signature) that hold in the ordered field R := (R, +, ·, 0, 1, ≤). The best known upper bound for the complexity of the associated decision problem is Pspace [4] , which leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 8. StatNE is in Pspace.
Proof. To prove membership in Pspace, we show that there is a polynomial-time procedure that on input G, s 0 , x, y returns an existential first-order sentence ψ such that (G, s 0 ) has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y if and only if ψ holds in R. How does ψ look like? Let α = (α i s,a ) i∈Π,s∈S,a∈Γ , v = (v i s ) i∈Π,s∈S , b = (b s ) s∈S and z = (z i s ) i∈Π,s∈S be four sets of variables. The formula
is indeed a stationary strategy for player i. Provided that each ϕ i (α) holds in R, the formula
states that v is a solution of the linear programme for computing the values of the MDP G σ −i (see [22, Section 9.3 
]), i.e. the formula is fulfilled if and only if
for all i ∈ Π and s ∈ S. The desired sentence ψ is the existential closure of the conjunction of the formulae ϕ i , η i and ϑ i combined with formulae stating that player i cannot improve her payoff and that the expected payoff for player i lies in-between the given thresholds:
Clearly, ψ can be constructed in polynomial time from G, s 0 , x and y. Moreover, ψ holds in R if and only if (G, s 0 ) has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff at least x and at most y.
The next theorem shows that StatNE is NP-hard, even for turn-based games with rewards 0 and 1. Note that this does not follow from the NP-hardness of PosNE, but requires a different proof.
Theorem 9.
StatNE is NP-hard, even for turn-based games with rewards 0 and 1.
Proof. We employ a reduction from SAT, which resembles a reduction in [26] . Given a Boolean formula ϕ = C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C m in conjunctive normal form over propositional variables X 1 , . . . , X n , where w.l.o.g. m ≥ 1 and each clause is nonempty, we build a turn-based game G played by players 0, 1, . . . , n as follows: The game G has states C 1 , . . . , C m controlled by player 0 and for each clause C and each literal L that occurs in C a state (C, L), controlled by player i if L = X i or L = ¬X i ; additionally, the game contains a terminal state ⊥. There are transitions from a clause C j to each state (C j , L) such that L occurs in C j and from there to C (j mod m)+1 , and there is a transition from each state of the form (C, ¬X) to ⊥. Each state except ⊥ has reward 1 for player 0, whereas ⊥ has reward 0 for player 0. For player i, all states except states of the form (C, X i ) have reward 1; states of the form (C, X i ) have reward 0. The structure of G is depicted in Figure 6 .
Clearly, G can be constructed from ϕ in polynomial time. In order to establish our reduction, we prove that the following statements are equivalent:
. . . (1. ⇒ 2.) Assume that α : {X 1 , . . . , X n } → {true, false} is a satisfying assignment for ϕ. We show that the positional strategy profile σ where at any time player 0 plays from a clause C to a fixed state (C, L) such that L is mapped to true by α and each player i ̸ = 0 never plays to ⊥ is a Nash equilibrium of (G, C 1 ) with payoff 1 for player 0. First note that the induced play never reaches ⊥. Hence, player 0 receives payoff 1, which is the best payoff player 0 can get.
To show that σ is a Nash equilibrium, consider any player i ̸ = 0 who receives payoff < 1. Hence, a state of the form (C, X i ) is visited in the induced play. However, as player 0 plays according to the satisfying assignment, no state of the form (C ′ , ¬X i ) is ever visited. Hence, player i cannot improve her payoff by playing to ⊥.
(2. ⇒ 3.) Trivial. (3. ⇒ 1.) Assume that (G, C 1 ) has a stationary Nash equilibrium σ with payoff ≥ 1 for player 0. Hence, the terminal state ⊥ is reached with probability 0 in σ. Consider the variable assignment α that maps X i to true if and only if player i receives payoff < 1 from σ; we claim that α satisfies the formula. Consider any clause C. By the construction of G, there exists a literal L ∈ C such that
(φ i ) < 1 and α maps X i to true, thus satisfying C. If L = ¬X i , then player i must receive payoff 1 since otherwise she could switch to the positional strategy τ that plays from (C, L) to ⊥; in the strategy profile (σ −i , τ) the state ⊥ is visited with probability 1, which gives payoff 1 to player i. Hence, α maps X i to false and satisfies C.
By combining our reduction with the game from Example 1, we can prove the following stronger result for concurrent games.
Corollary 10.
Deciding the existence of a stationary Nash equilibrium in a concurrent limit-average game with rewards 0 and 1 is NP-hard.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Corollary 7. From a given concurrent limit-average game (G,
Recently, Allender et al. [1] showed that SqrtSum belongs to the fourth level of the counting hierarchy, a slight improvement over the previously known Pspace upper bound. However, it has been an open question since the 1970s as to whether SqrtSum falls into the polynomial hierarchy [15, 11] . We give a polynomial-time reduction from SqrtSum to StatNE for turn-based terminal-reward games. Hence, StatNE is at least as hard as SqrtSum, and showing that StatNE resides inside the polynomial hierarchy would imply a major breakthrough in understanding the complexity of numerical computations. While our reduction is similar to the one in [27] , it requires new techniques to simulate stochastic states.
Theorem 11. SqrtSum is polynomial-time reducible to StatNE for turn-based 8-player terminal-reward games.
Before we state the reduction, let us first examine the game G(p), where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, which is played by players 0, 1, . . . , 5 and depicted in Figure 7 .
Lemma 12. The maximal payoff player 1 receives in a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G(p), s 1 ) where player 0 receives payoff ≥ 0 equals √ p.
Proof. Let σ be a stationary strategy profile of (G(p), s 1 ) where player 0 receives payoff ≥ 0, and let q i = σ 0 (v i | u i ) be the probability that player 0 moves from u i to v i . We claim that q :
Since σ is a Nash equilibrium, we have z ≥ 1 − p and z ′ ≥ 1 (otherwise player 4 or player 5 would prefer to leave the game at r 2 or t 2 ). On the other hand, since at every terminal state the sum of the rewards for players 4 and 5 is at most 2 − p, we have z + z ′ ≤ 2 − p. Hence, z = 1 − p and z ′ = 1. Now consider the expected payoffs for players 4 and 5 from r 1 :
Since σ is a Nash equilibrium, these numbers are bounded from below by 1 and 1 − p, respectively (otherwise, player 4 or player 5 would leave the game at r 1 or t 1 ). Hence, q 1 = 1 − p. The reasoning that q 2 = 1 − p is analogous. In the following, assume without loss of generality that 0 < p < 1 (otherwise the statement of the lemma is trivial). For any stationary strategy profile σ of G(p) where player 0 receives payoff ≥ 0, let
be the probabilities that player 0 does not leave the game at v 1 , respectively v 2 . Given x 1 and x 2 , for i = 1, 2 we can compute the payoff f i (x 1 ,
To have a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ), f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ 1 since otherwise player 2 or player 3 would prefer to leave the game at s 1 or s 2 , respectively, which would give the respective player payoff 1 immediately. Vice versa, if f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ), f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ 1 then σ is a Nash equilibrium with expected payoff 
for player 1. Hence, to determine the maximum payoff for player 1 in a stationary Nash equilibrium where player 0 receives payoff ≥ 0, we have to maximise f (x 1 , x 2 ) under the constraints f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ), f 2 (x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ x 1 , x 2 ≤ 1. We claim that the maximum is reached only if x 1 = x 2 . If e.g. x 1 > x 2 , then we can achieve a higher payoff for player 1 by setting x ′ 2 := x 1 , and the constraints are still satisfied:
Hence, it suffices to maximise f (x, x) subject to f 1 (x, x) ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, which is equivalent to maximising f (x, x) subject to (1 − p)x 2 − 2x + 1 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. and The roots of the quadratic function are (1 ± √ p)/(1 − p),
strictly increasing on [0, 1], the optimal solution is x 0 , and the maximal payoff for player 1 in a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G(p), s 1 ) where player 0 receives payoff ≥ 0 equals indeed 
For the reduction, we use n copies of the game G(p), where in the ith copy we set p to p i ; in each copy, we set the rewards to player 6 and player 7 at all terminal states to 1 and 0, respectively. The complete game G is depicted in Figure 8 ; it can obviously be constructed in polynomial time. We claim that in any (stationary) Nash equilibrium of (G, s n ) where player 0 receives payoff ≥ 0 the probability of reaching the game G(p i ) equals 1/(n + 1) for all i = 1, . . . , n. First note that in any such equilibrium the state s 0 must be reached with positive probability since otherwise player 7 would prefer to leave the game at one of the states r i , giving player 0 payoff < 0. Now let σ be a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G, s n ) where player 0 receives payoff ≥ 0, and set q i := σ 0 (s i−1 | t i ). By induction on i, we prove that q i = i/(i + 1). For i = 1, this is true because if q i > 1 2 then player 6 would prefer to leave the game at s 1 , and if q i < 1 2 then player 7 would prefer to leave the game at r 1 . Now let i > 1 and assume that q j = j/(j + 1) for all j < i. A simple calculation reveals that the expected payoffs for player 6 and player 7 from s i−1 equal (i − 1)/i and (n + 1)/i, respectively. Hence, the expected payoff for player 6 from state t i equals
If q i > i/(i + 1), then this number would be strictly smaller than i/(i + 1), and player 6 would be better off by leaving the game at s i . On the other hand, the expected payoff for player 7 from state t i equals q i (n + 1)/i. If q i < i/(i + 1), then this number would be strictly smaller than (n + 1)/(i + 1), and player 7 would prefer to leave the game at r i . In both cases, we have a contradiction to σ being a Nash equilibrium. Hence, q i = i/(i + 1) for all i = 1, . . . , n, and the probability of reaching the game G(p i ) from s n equals
It remains to be shown that (G, s n ) has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ (0,
, 0, . . . , 0) if and only if ∑ n i=1
By Lemma 12, the maximal payoff player 1 receives in a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G(p i ), s 1 ) where player 0 receives payoff at least 0 equals
Hence, the maximal payoff player 1 receives in a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G, s n ) where player 0 receives payoff at least 0 equals
We conclude that (G, s n ) has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ (0,
Again, we can combine our reduction with the game from Example 1 to prove a stronger result for games that are not turn-based.
Corollary 13.
Deciding whether a concurrent 8-player terminal reward game has a stationary Nash equilibrium is hard for SqrtSum.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Corollary 7, but we use the game G 1 from Example 1 instead of the game G 2 , and player 0 receives reward 0 in each state of G 1 and reward −1 in the new terminal state. Since G 1 is a terminalreward game, the resulting game G ′ is a terminal-reward game if the original game G is a terminal-reward game.
Remark 14. The positive results of Sections 4 and 5 can easily be extended to equilibria in pure or randomised strategies with a memory of a fixed size k ∈ N: a nondeterministic algorithm can guess a memory structure M of size k and then look for a positional, respectively stationary, equilibrium in the product of the original game G with the memory M. Hence, for any fixed k ∈ N, we can decide in Pspace (NP) the existence of a randomised (pure) equilibrium of size k with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y. Moreover, these results extend to stochastic games (by appealing to results on MDPs with limit-average objectives; see e.g. [22] ).
Pure Strategies
In this section, we show that PureNE is decidable and, in fact, NP-complete. Let G be a concurrent game, s ∈ S and i ∈ Π. We define
where σ ranges over all pure strategy profiles of G and τ ranges over all strategies of player i. Intuitively, pval G i (s) is the lowest payoff that the coalition Π \ {i} can inflict on player i by playing a pure strategy.
By a reduction to a turn-based two-player zero-sum game, we can show that there is a positional strategy profile that attains this value. Proof. We define a turn-based two-player zero-sum game G ′ with players 0 and 1 as follows: The set of states of G ′ is S ′ = S ∪ (S × Γ Π ). At a state s ∈ S, player 1 chooses an action profile a that is legal at s, which leads the game to the state (s, a). At a state of the form (s, a), player 0 chooses an action b ∈ Γ i (s), which leads the game to the state δ (s, (a −i , b) ). Finally, player 0's reward at a state s ∈ S or (s, a) ∈ S × Γ Π is r ′ (s) = r ′ (s, a) = r i (s) (and player 1's reward is the opposite). By [10] , there exists a function ν : S ′ → Q (the value function) and positional strategies σ * and τ * for player 1 and player 0, respectively, such that E τ,σ * s (φ ′ 0 ) ≤ ν(s) for all s ∈ S ′ and all strategies τ of player 0 in G ′ , and
for all s ∈ S ′ and all strategies σ of player 1 in G ′ . We can translate player 1's strategy σ * into a positional strategy profile σ * of G such that
for all states s ∈ S and all strategies τ of player i in G. Hence,
for all s ∈ S, which implies that pval G i (s) = ν(s) for all s ∈ S and that σ * is the strategy profile we are looking for. Otherwise, there would exist a pure strategy profile σ in G such that sup τ E σ −i ,τ s (φ i ) < ν(s) for some s ∈ S. But we could translate such a strategy profile σ into a pure strategy σ of player 1 in
, a contradiction to the optimality of τ * .
Given a payoff vector z ∈ (R ∪ {±∞}) Π , we define a directed graph G(z) = (V, E) (with self-loops) as follows: V = S, and there is an edge from s to t if and only if there is an action profile a with δ(s, a) = t such that (1) a is legal at s and (2) pval
Following [3] , we call any a that fulfils (1) and (2) z-secure at s.
Lemma 16.
Let z ∈ (R ∪ {±∞}) Π . If there exists an infinite path π in G(z) from s 0 with z i ≤ φ i (π) for each player i, then (G, s 0 ) has a pure Nash equilibrium with payoff φ i (π) for player i.
Proof. Let π = s 0 s 1 . . . be an infinite path in G(z) from s 0 with z i ≤ φ i (π) for each player i. We define a pure strategy profile σ as follows: For histories of the form x = s 0 a 0 s 1 . . . s k−1 a k−1 s k , we set σ(x) to an action profile a with δ(s k , a) = s k+1 that is z-secure at s k . For all other histories x = t 0 a 0 t 1 . . . t k−1 a k−1 t k , consider the least j such that s j+1 ̸ = t j+1 . If a j differs from a z-secure action profile a at s j in precisely one entry i, we set σ(x) = σ * (t k ), where σ * is a (fixed) positional strategy profile such that E
for all s ∈ S (which is guaranteed to exist by Proposition 15); otherwise, σ(x) can be chosen arbitrarily. It is easy to see that σ is a Nash equilibrium with induced play π. Lemma 17. Let σ be a pure Nash equilibrium of (G, s 0 ) with payoff z. Then there exists an infinite path π in G(z) from s 0 with φ i (π) = z i for each player i. Proof. Let s 0 a 0 s 1 a 1 . . . be the play induced by σ. We claim that π := s 0 s 1 . . . is a path in G(z). Otherwise, consider the least k such that (s k , s k+1 ) is not an edge in G(z). Hence, there exists no z-secure action profile at s := s k . Since a k is certainly legal at s, there exists a player i and an action b ∈ Γ i (s) such that pval , (a −i , b) )) > z i . But then player i can improve her payoff by switching to a strategy that mimics σ i until s is reached, then plays action b, and after that mimics a strategy that ensures payoff > z i against any pure strategy profile. This contradicts the assumption that σ is a Nash equilibrium.
Using Lemmas 16 and 17, we can reduce the task of finding a pure Nash equilibrium to the task of finding a path in a multi-weighted graph whose limit-average weight vector falls between two thresholds. The latter problem can be solved in polynomial time by solving a linear programme with one variable for each pair of a weight function and an edge in the graph, as we prove in the appendix.
Theorem 18. Given a finite directed graph G = (V, E) with weight functions r 0 , . . . , r k−1 : V → Q, v 0 ∈ V, and x, y ∈ (Q ∪ {±∞}) k , we can decide in polynomial time whether there exists an infinite path π = v 0 v 1 . . . in G with
We can now describe a nondeterministic algorithm to decide the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y in polynomial time. The algorithm starts by guessing, for each player i, a positional strategy profile σ i of G and computes p i (s) := sup τ E σ i −i ,τ s (φ i ) for each s ∈ S; these numbers can be computed in polynomial time using the algorithm given by Karp [18] . The algorithm then guesses a vector z ∈ (R ∪ {±∞}) Π by setting z i either to x i or to p i (s) for some s ∈ S with x i ≤ p i (s), and constructs the graph G ′ (z), which is defined as G(z) but with p i (s) substituted for pval G i (s). Finally, the algorithm determines (in polynomial time) whether there exists an infinite path π in G(z) from s 0 with z i ≤ φ i (π) ≤ y i for all i ∈ Π. If such a path exists, the algorithm accepts; otherwise it rejects.
Theorem 19. PureNE is in NP.
Proof. We claim that the algorithm described above is correct, i.e. sound and complete. To prove soundness, assume that the algorithm accepts its input. Hence, there exists an infinite path π in G ′ (z) from s 0 with z i ≤ φ i (π) ≤ y i . Since pval G i (s) ≤ p i (s) for all i ∈ Π and s ∈ S, the graph G ′ (z) is a subgraph of G(z). Hence, π is also an infinite path in G(z). By Lemma 16, we can conclude that (G, s 0 ) has a pure Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ z ≥ x and ≤ y.
To prove that the algorithm is complete, let σ be a pure Nash equilibrium of (G, s 0 ) with payoff z, where x ≤ z ≤ y. By Proposition 15, the algorithm can guess positional strategy profiles σ i such that p i (s) = pval G i (s) for all s ∈ S. If the algorithm additionally guesses the payoff vector z ′ defined by
then the graph G(z) coincides with the graph G(z ′ ) (and thus with G ′ (z ′ )). By Lemma 17, there exists an infinite path π in G(z) from s 0 such that
Hence, the algorithm accepts.
The following theorem shows that PureNE is NP-hard. In fact, NP-hardness holds even for turn-based games with rewards 0 and 1.
Theorem 20. PureNE is NP-hard, even for turn-based games with rewards 0 and 1.
Proof. Again, we reduce from SAT. Given a Boolean formula ϕ = C 1 ∧ · · · ∧ C m in conjunctive normal form over propositional variables X 1 , . . . , X n , where w.l.o.g. m ≥ 1 and each clause is nonempty, let G be the turn-based game described in the proof of Theorem 9 and depicted in Figure 6 . We claim that the following statements are equivalent:
1. ϕ is satisfiable. 2. (G, C 1 ) has a positional Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ 1 for player 0. 3. (G, C 1 ) has a pure Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ 1 for player 0.
Since the implication (1. ⇒ 2.) was already proved in the proof of Theorem 9 and the implication (2. ⇒ 3.) is trivial, we only need to prove that 3. implies 1. Hence, assume that (G, C 1 ) has a pure Nash equilibrium σ with payoff ≥ 1 for player 0. Since player 0 receives payoff ≥ 1, the terminal state ⊥ is not reached in the induced play π. Consider the variable assignment α that maps X i to true if and only if player i receives payoff < 1 from π; we claim that α satisfies the formula. Consider any clause C. Set T = {(C, X i ), (C, ¬X i ) : i = 1, . . . , n}, and denote by 1 s the characteristic function of s ∈ T. We have
In particular, there exists a state s = (C, L) such that lim inf
If L = X i , then r i ≤ 1 − 1 s . Hence, φ i (π) < 1, and α maps X i to true, thereby satisfying C. If L = ¬X i , then player i must receive payoff 1, because otherwise she could improve her payoff by playing from s to ⊥. Hence, α maps X i to false and satisfies C.
It follows from Theorems 19 and 20 that PureNE is NP-complete. By combining our reduction with a game that has no pure Nash equilibrium, we can prove the following stronger result for non-turn-based games.
Corollary 21.
Deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in a concurrent limit-average game is NP-complete, even for games with rewards 0 and 1.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Corollary 10.
Note that Theorem 20 and Corollary 21 do not apply to terminal-reward games. In fact, PureNE is decidable in P for these games, which follows from two facts about terminal-reward games: (1) the numbers pval G i (s) can be computed in polynomial time (using a reduction to a turn-based two-player zero-sum game and applying a result of Washburn [31] ), and (2) the only possible vectors that can emerge as the payoff of a pure strategy profile are the zero vector and the reward vectors at terminal states.
Theorem 22. PureNE is in P for terminal-reward games.
Randomised Strategies
In this section, we show that the problem NE is undecidable and, in fact, not recursively enumerable for turn-based terminal-reward games. The proof proceeds by a reduction from an undecidable problem about two-counter machines. Such a machine is of the form M = (Q, q 0 , ∆), where -Q is a finite set of states,
The set Γ specifies which instructions M may perform on its counters. For our purposes, the instruction set Γ := {inc(j), dec(j), zero(j) : j = 1, 2} suffices: a counter can be incremented, decremented, or tested for zero. For q ∈ Q we write q∆ for the set of all (γ,
where q denotes the current state and i j denotes the current value of counter j. A configuration
A partial computation of M is a sequence ρ = ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . of configurations such that ρ(0) ⊢ ρ(1) ⊢ · · · and ρ(0) = (q 0 , 0, 0) (the initial configuration). A partial computation of M is a computation of M if it is infinite or it ends in a configuration C for which there is no C ′ with C ⊢ C ′ . Note that each deterministic two-counter machine has a unique computation.
The halting problem is to decide, given a machine M, whether the computation of M is finite. It is well-known that deterministic two-counter machines are Turing powerful, which makes the halting problem and its dual, the non-halting problem, undecidable, even when restricted to deterministic two-counter machines. In fact, the non-halting problem for deterministic two-counter machines is not recursively enumerable.
To prove the undecidability of NE, we employ a reduction from the nonhalting problem for deterministic two-counter machines. More precisely, we show how to compute from such a machine M a game (G, s 0 ) such that the computation of M is infinite if and only if there exists a Nash equilibrium of (G, s 0 ) where player 0 receives expected payoff ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that in M there is no zero test that is followed by another zero test:
The game G is played by players 0, 1 and 12 other players A t j , B t j , D t and E j , indexed by j ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ {0, 1}. Intuitively, player 0 and player 1 build up the computation of M: player 0 updates the counters, and player 1 chooses transitions. Players A t j and B t j make sure that player 0 updates the counters correctly: players A 0 j and A 1 j ensure that, in each step, the value of counter j is not too high, and players B 0 j and B 1 j ensure that, in each step, the value of counter j is not too low. More precisely, A 0 j and B 0 j monitor the even steps of the computation, while A 1 j and B 1 j monitor the odd steps. Finally, players D t and E j ensure that player 0 uses a randomised strategy of a restricted form.
Let Γ ′ := Γ ∪ {init}. For each q ∈ Q, each γ ∈ Γ ′ , each j ∈ {1, 2} and each t ∈ {0, 1}, the game G contains the gadgets S t γ,q , I t q and C t γ,j , which are depicted in Figure 9 . The initial state of G is s 0 := s 0 init,q 0 . Note that in the gadget S t γ,q , each of the players A t j , B t j , D t and E j may unilaterally decide to quit the game, which gives the respective player a payoff of 1 or 2, but payoff −1 to player 0.
It will turn out that player 1 will play a pure strategy in any Nash equilibrium of (G, s 0 ) where player 0 receives expected payoff 0, except possibly for histories that are not consistent with the equilibrium. Moreover, player 0 has to play a uniform distribution inside S t γ,q . Formally, we say that a strategy profile σ of G is safe if 1. σ 0 (xs) assigns probability 1 2 to both outgoing transitions for all histories xs consistent with σ and ending in a state s ∈ S t γ,q controlled by player 0, and 2. σ 1 (xs) is degenerate for all histories xs consistent with σ and ending in a state s controlled by player 1.
For each safe strategy profile σ where player 0 receives expected payoff 0, let x 0 s 0 ≺ x 1 s 1 ≺ x 2 s 2 ≺ . . . (x i ∈ S * , s i ∈ S, x 0 = ε) be the unique sequence consisting of all histories xs of (G, s 0 ) consistent with σ that end in a state s of the form s = s t γ,q . This sequence is infinite because σ is safe and player 0 receives expected payoff 0. Additionally, let q 0 , q 1 , . . . be the corresponding sequence of states and γ 0 , γ 1 , . . . be the corresponding sequence of instructions, i.e. s n = s 0 γ n ,q n or s n = s 1 γ n ,q n for all n ∈ N. For each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ N, we define two conditional expectations as follows:
Note that at every terminal state of the counter gadgets C t γ,j and C
1−t
γ,j the rewards of player A t j and player B t j sum up to 4. For each j, the conditional probability that, given the history x n s n , we reach such a state is ∑ k∈N 
I t q for q∆ = ∅: Figure 9 . Simulating a two-counter machine. a n j + b n j = 2 for all n ∈ N. We say that σ is stable if a n j = 1 or, equivalently, b n j = 1 for each j ∈ {1, 2} and for all n ∈ N.
Finally, for each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ N, we define a number c n j ∈ [0, 1] as follows: After the history x n s n , with probability 1 4 the play proceeds to the state controlled by player 0 in the counter gadget C n mod 2 γ n ,j . The number c n j is defined as the probability that player 0 plays to the neighbouring grey state. Note that, by the construction of G, it holds that c n j = 1 if γ n = zero(j) or γ n = init. In particular, c 0 1 = c 0 2 = 1.
Lemma 23. Let σ be a safe strategy profile with expected payoff 0 for player 0. Then σ is stable if and only if
(1) for each j ∈ {1, 2} and for all n ∈ N.
To prove the lemma, consider a safe strategy profile σ of G with expected payoff 0 for player 0. For each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ N, we define yet another conditional expectation
The following claim relates the numbers a n j and p n j . Claim. Let j ∈ {1, 2}. Then a n j = 1 for all n ∈ N if and only if p n j = 3 4 for all n ∈ N.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that a n j = 1 for all n ∈ N. We have a n j = p n j + for all n ∈ N, the numbers a n j have to satisfy the following recurrence: a n+2 j = 4a n j − 3. Since all the numbers a n j are bounded by the minimum and maximum reward for player A n mod 2 j , we have 0 ≤ a n j ≤ 4 for all n ∈ N. It is easy to see that the only values for a 0 j and a 1 j such that 0 ≤ a n j ≤ 4 for all n ∈ N are a 0 j = a 1 j = 1. But this implies that a n j = 1 for all n ∈ N.
Proof (of Lemma 23) . By the previous claim, it suffices to show that p n j = 3 4 if and only if (1) holds. Let j ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ N and t = n mod 2. The number p n j can be expressed as a weighted average of the expected payoff for player A t j inside C t γ n ,j and the expected payoff for player A t j inside C The next lemma states that every Nash equilibrium with expected payoff 0 for player 0 is, in fact, safe.
Lemma 24. Let σ be a Nash equilibrium of (G, s 0 ) with expected payoff 0 for player 0. Then σ is safe.
Proof. We start by proving that player 0 plays a uniform distribution inside S t γ,q . We prove this separately for histories that end in a white state and histories that end in a grey state.
Let xs be a history consistent with σ and ending in a white state s ∈ S t γ,q controlled by player 0. Since the players E 1 and E 2 can ensure payoff 1 by quitting the game, player 0 has to play to C t γ,1 and C t γ,2 with probability 1 2 each. Otherwise, σ would not be a Nash equilibrium. Now let xs be a history consistent with σ and ending in a grey state s ∈ S t γ,q controlled by player 0. In the following, let t = 0; the proof for t = 1 is analogous. Denote by p the probability that player 0 plays to t ∈ I t q after the history xs. For i ∈ {0, 1}, let 
Since σ is a Nash equilibrium, these numbers are bounded from below by 2 and 1, respectively (otherwise, it would be better for player D 0 or D 1 to quit the game). Hence, p = 1 2 . To prove that σ is safe, it remains to be shown that player 1 plays a degenerate distribution for all histories xs consistent with σ and ending in a state s ∈ I t q . Towards a contradiction, assume that xs is such a history and that σ 1 (xs) assigns probability > 0 to two distinct successor states. Hence, q∆ = {(zero(j), q 1 ), (dec(j), q 2 )} for some j ∈ {1, 2} and q 1 , q 2 ∈ Q. By our assumption that there are no consecutive zero tests and since player 0 receives expected payoff 0,
Hence, player 1 could improve her payoff by playing to s 1−t zero(j),q 1 with probability 1, a contradiction to σ being a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 25. NE is not recursively enumerable, even for turn-based 14-player terminal-reward games.
Proof. We claim that the function mapping a deterministic two-counter machine M to the 14-player game (G, s 0 ) as described above realises a many-one reduction from the non-halting problem to NE. Clearly, G can be computed from M. We prove that the computation of M is infinite if and only if (G, s 0 ) has a Nash equilibrium in which player 0 receives expected payoff (at least) 0.
(⇒) Assume that the computation ρ = ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . of M is infinite. Player 0's equilibrium strategy σ 0 can be described as follows: For a history that ends at the unique state controlled by player 0 in the gadget C t γ,j after visiting a state of the form s t γ ′ ,q or s
exactly n > 0 times, player 0 plays to the grey successor state with probability 2 −i , where i is the value of counter j in configuration ρ(n − 1). Moreover, for a history that ends at a state controlled by player 0 in the gadget S t γ,q , player 0 plays to both successors with probability Any other player's pure strategy is defined as follows: After a history ending in S t γ,q , the strategy prescribes to quit the game if and only if the history is not compatible with ρ (i.e. the corresponding sequence of instructions does not match ρ).
Note that the resulting strategy profile σ is safe. Moreover, since player 0 and player 1 follow the computation of M, a terminal state inside one of the counter gadgets C t γ,j is reached with probability 1. Since player 0 receives reward 0 at any such terminal state, player 0's expected payoff equals 0. Finally, by the definition of σ, for each j ∈ {1, 2} and for all n ∈ N, if i and i ′ are the values of counter j in configuration ρ(n) and configuration ρ(n + 1), respectively, then c n j = 2 −i , c n+1 j = 2 −i ′ , and γ n+1 is the instruction corresponding to the counter update from ρ(n) to ρ(n + 1). Hence, (1) holds, and we can conclude from Lemma 23 that σ is stable.
We claim that σ is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium of (G, s 0 ): It is obvious that player 0 cannot improve her payoff. If player 1 deviates, then with positive probability we reach a history that is not compatible with ρ; hence, player A 0 1 or A 1 1 will quit the game, which ensures that player 1 will receive payoff 0 after this history. Since σ is stable, none of the players A t j or B t j can improve her payoff. Finally, the expected payoffs of player D t and player D 1−t from s t γ,q equal 2 and 1, respectively, which is the same as they would get if they quit the game. The reasoning for players E 1 and E 2 is analogous.
(⇐) Assume that σ is a Nash equilibrium of (G, s 0 ) with expected payoff ≥ 0 for player 0. Since 0 is the maximum reward for player 0, this means that the expected payoff of σ for player 0 equals 0. From Lemma 24, we can conclude that σ is safe. To apply Lemma 23 and obtain (1), it remains to be shown that σ is stable. In order to derive a contradiction, assume that there exists j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ N such that either a n j < 1 or a n j > 1, i.e. b n j < 1. In the first case, player A n mod 2 j could improve her payoff by quitting the game after history x n s n , while in the second case, player B n mod 2 j could improve her payoff by quitting the game, again a contradiction to σ being a Nash equilibrium.
From (1) and the fact that c 0 j = 1, it follows that each c n j is of the form c n j = 2 −i with i ∈ N. We denote by i n j the unique number i such that c n j = 2 −i and set ρ(n) = (q n , i n 1 , i n 2 ) for each n ∈ N. We claim that ρ := ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . is in fact the computation of M. In particular, this computation is infinite. It suffices to verify the following two properties:
-ρ(0) = (q 0 , 0, 0). -ρ(n) ⊢ ρ(n + 1) for all n ∈ N.
The first property is immediate. To prove the second property, let ρ(n) = (q, i 1 , i 2 ) and ρ(n + 1) = (q ′ , i ′ 1 , i ′ 2 ). Hence, s n lies inside S t γ,q , and s n+1 lies inside S 1−t γ ′ ,q ′ for suitable γ, γ ′ and t = n mod 2. We only prove the claim for q∆ = {(zero(1), q 1 ), (dec(1), q 2 )}; the other cases are similar. Note that, by the construction of the gadget I t q , it must be the case that either q ′ = q 1 and γ ′ = zero(1), or q ′ = q 2 and γ ′ = dec(1). By For games that are not turn-based, we can show the stronger theorem that the set of all games that have a Nash equilibrium is not recursively enumerable.
Corollary 26.
The set of all initialised concurrent 14-player terminal-reward games that have a Nash equilibrium is not recursively enumerable.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Corollary 10, but we use the game G 1 from Example 1 instead of the game G 2 , and we set the reward for player 0 in each state of G 1 to 0.
Conclusion
We have analysed the complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we have shown that randomisation in strategies leads to undecidability, while restricting to pure strategies retains decidability. This is in contrast to stochastic games, where pure strategies lead to undecidability [27] . While we have provided matching and lower bounds in most cases, there remain some problems where we do not know the exact complexity. Apart from StatNE, these include the problem PureNE when restricted to a bounded number of players. We have thus found a subsequence of r 0 (π n)/n that converges to z 0 , which implies that φ 0 (π) = lim inf n→∞ r 0 (π n)/n ≤ z 0 . On the other hand, using the fact that lim n→∞ r 0 (ζ i n )/|ζ i n | ≥ z 0 for all i ∈ [k], we can show that φ 0 (π) ≥ z 0 .
Proof (of Theorem 18). Since the limit-average criterion is prefix-independent, it suffices to decompose G into its strongly connected components (which can be done in linear time) and check for each component C that is reachable from v 0 whether exists an infinite path in C with x ≤ φ(π) ≤ y. By Lemmas 27 and 29, such a path exists if and only if there exists a solution to the linear constraints (1)- (5) derived from C. The existence of such a solution can be checked in polynomial time (see [23] ).
